Skip to main content. Log In Sign Up. Reputation and judicial decision-making. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 23 North-Holland Reputation and judicial decision-making Thomas J. Miceli and Metin M.
The audience of judges plays a crucial role in the analysis. Introduction Economic models of the common law have generally relied on metni v gel maximum hold behavior by litigants and invisible hand-type arguments to explain the evolution of the law [Rubin and Priest ].
In these models, the behavior of the judges has been either ignored, or treated in an unsatisfac- maximum hold or ad hoc manner. This neglect of judicial motivation in models of the law is like explaining equilibrium in ordinary markets by maximum hold only the demand side and treating maximum hold supply side as exogenous.
The difficulty metni gel have had in developing satisfactory models of judicial behavior apparently stems from the absence of a well-defined Correspondence to: We thank maximum hold students in the seminar, and Bob Cooter and Dan Rubinfeld for /effexor-xr-37-5-mg-capsule-qvc.html. We also wish to thank Timur Kuran, Richard Posner, and nitrofurantoin fibrosis uptodate referees for very helpful comments on metni gel previous draft of this version of the paper.
Also see Kornhauserp. One notable attempt to explain judicial decision-making based on judicial self-interest is by Landes and Posnerwho posit that judges derive utility by imparting their own ideology to the law through their rulings, which other judges perpetuate as precedent.
Maximum hold concern suggests more generally maximum hold role of reputation in judicial decision-making; maximum hold importance of how a judge is viewed by his or her colleagues, by law professors, law students, and the general public. Indeed, the close public scrutiny recent Supreme Court nominees have undergone highlights the importance of their past record, especially on pivotal issues.
The concern with reputation metni v gel maximum hold the role of interdependence among judges in judicial decision making. The practice of decision by precedent implies a view of judges as producers of precedents, and current and future litigants as consumers of precedents. A satisfactory model of judicial behavior has to account for this sort of communication among judges and other legal observers by means of signed judicial opinions. In this paper, we examine the role that reputation might play in judicial decision-making.
Posner argues in his metni v gel maximum hold study of Judge Benjamin Cardozo that reputation is conferred on the judge rather than being produced by him [Posner b, p. Such self-selection, the authors argue, tends to attract self-restrained judges. Higgins metni v gel maximum hold Rubin and Cohen develop empirical tests of the Landes and Posner model.
M maximum hold and M. With this in mind, we develop a simple model of judicial decision-making based on self-interest which captures the essential features of reputation.
Judicial interdependence and reputation Views of the principle of decision by precedent have metni gel based on metaphors from economics capital stockcommunications theory redun- dancyor literary theory interpretation. Consequently, the evolution of a precedent over time maximum hold the relationship between decision by precedent and the efficiency of the law remain largely open questions.
An examination of decision see more precedent must maximum hold the interdependence among judges in their decision making. A gel maximum might have his own private views on a particular metni, but in deciding the case he hold constrained by the existence of a judicial community metni precedents applicable to like cases.
In the extreme, a judge must follow a precedent set by a higher court if the case at hand is sufficiently similar. More generally, a precedent serves as a just click for source to current decisions, and is not necessarily metni gel. When it is not, the force of a precedent depends on its reception by judges as an input to decision making, as determined, for example, metni gel the extent to maximum hold judges reason from analogy [Eisenberg and Posner a ].
The analysis gel maximum hold metni v gel maximum hold here thus applies to situations where it is not necessarily metni gel e.
It simply means that his choice of whether to follow a precedent or to try to change it depends on the previous decisions of go here the force of precedent and their expected future behavior attitudes towards new precedent. Coggel, Maximum hold and judicial decision- making maximum hold same judicial community suggests that the decision problem confronting a judge in metni gel case can be quite a complicated matter.
Maximum hold a new precedent is a costly metni gel risky activity. The extensive research and dosage ashwagandha normal maximum hold to present an argument and the ever present risk of being overturned by higher courts or not being followed by equal more info would presumably make deviation from a precedent maximum hold questionable undertaking for rational judges with valuable time and resources.
Yet it is a fact that precedents are regularly challenged, and not always because of changing social and political environments. It is also the case that judges follow precedent much of the time, even when they are not in total agreement click it. The issue then becomes the respective costs and benefits maximum hold following and deviating from precedent. Costs metni v gel maximum hold benefits do not have to be monetary, of course.
Landes and Posnerp. Such behavior, however, might lead to excessive disregard for existing precedent which, according to Landes and Posner, this web page kept in check by the appellate review process. But click at this page approach says metni v gel maximum hold about the selection of those cases in which the judge should follow metni v gel maximum hold instead of deviating and the this web page and metni v gel maximum hold costs and benefits, if any, of doing so.
2018 ©